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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Testimony of Accomplice Not Corroborating Evidence for Conspiracy Con-
vicfion
If a person is charged with sale of narcotics, the buyer's uncorroborated testi-
mony is sufficient to sustain the conviction.-7 However, in People v. Malizia,38
the defendant, according to the fourth count of his indictment, allegedly conspired
with one Calvin Malone to commit the crimes of feloniously selling a narcotics
drug, feloniously possessing a narcotic drug with intent to sell, and committing
acts injurious to public health and morals. The fourth count of the indictment
was sufficiently corroborated. One particular sale between defendant as seller and
Malone as buyer made up the first count of the indictment, as well as being set out
as a part of the conspiracy under the fourth count. The sale described in the fourth
count was corroborated only by Malone who was, under the fourth count, the
co-conspirator of the defendant. The defendant was convicted under the first
and fourth counts of the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed the con-
viction. 
9
The Court of Appeals held that Malone was an accomplice of the defendant
as a matter of law under both counts. Therefore, Malone's uncorroborated testi-
mony was not sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction under the first count.
Thus, the Court points out that the principle of the buyer's uncorroborated
testimony being sufficient to convict is limited by the statutory provision that an
accomplice's testimony alone is not sufficient to convict his "brother in crime."40
Power of Grand Jury
In New York State the Grand Jury derives its power from the Constitution
and the acts of the legislature.4 ' It is sworn to inquire into crimes committed or
triable in the county for which it is drawn, 42 and is duty bound to make such
inquiries and present them to the court.4 3 In the absence of a clear constitutional
or legislative restriction, the New York courts have traditionally allowed the
Grand Jury a wide discretion in the exercise of these powers.44 The imposition
of these duties and powers has a duality of purpose--one, in the interests of society
to see that persons who are justly suspected of crime are held to answer; the
other in the interest of the citizen, to insure him from unjust accusations which
37. People v. Pasquarello, 282 App.Div. 405, 123 N.Y.S.2d 98 (4th Dep't
1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 759, 118 N.E.2d 361 (1954).
38. 4 N.Y.2d 22, 171 N.Y.S.2d 844#(1958).
39. 4 A.D.2d 106, 163 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1st Dep't 1957).
40. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PP0C. §399.
41. N. Y. CONST. ART. 1 §6; N. Y. CODE CRIA. PROC. §§223, 245, 252, 253.
42. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §223.
43. Id., §245.
44. People ex rel. Hirschberg v. Close, 1 N.Y.2d 258, 152 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
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are motivated by malice.45 Full power is granted to the Grand Jury, independent
of the District Attorney or the court, to conduct investigations upon its own
initiative and to present indictments charging persons with crimes regardless
whether a preliminary arrest or examination has occurred.46
While the Grand Jury, under the broad provision of section 245 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, generally has the power to inquire into all offenses whether
felonies or misdemeanors, it is without jurisdiction to indict for offenses within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of Special Sessions unless a certificate
issues from a judge of a county court or supreme court, that it is reasonable to
prosecute the offense by indictment.47 This certificate divests the Court of Special
Sessions of jurisdiction over such misdemeanors.
A. In a recent decision, People v. Ryback,48 the jurisdictional divestiture
effected by such a certificate under the comparable section of the New York
City Criminal Courts Act49 was held not to affect the plenary inquisitorial powers
inherent in the Grand Jury.
In this case the original Grand Jury for General Sessions, uppn a presentation
of the matter to it by the District Attorney, refused to indict for felonious assault,
but directed the District Attorney to file an information in Special Sessions
charging the defendant with third degree assault-a misdemeanor. Such procedure
was followed, whereupon defendants applied to General Sessions for a certificate
allowing the charge to be prosecuted by indictment. The subsequent indictment
by the Grand Jury included counts for second degree assault, a felony, as well as
the misdemeanor charge of third degree assault. Defendants moved unsuccessfully
to dismiss the felonious assault charge, contending that the Grand Jury lacked
power to so indict. Upon denial of this motion the defendants were tried before
a jury which failed to reach a verdict. On retrial they were convicted of third
degree assault and prosecuted this appeal.
Defendants' main contention was that the indictment for assault second
was invalid, because the court order removing the actions from Special Sessions to
General Sessions for prosecution by indictment authorized only an indictment for
the charge laid before Special Sessions, third degree assault. A second contention
was that the action of the original Grand Jury in directing prosecution by informa-
45. In re Funston, 133 Misc. 620, 233 N.Y.Supp. 81 (1929).
46. Manning v. Valente, 272 App.Div. 358, 72 N.Y.S.2d 88, affd', 297 N.Y.
681, 77 N.E.2d 3(1947).
47. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC., § §56, 57.
48. 3 N.Y.2d 467, 168 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1957).
49. §31(1).
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tion amounted to a dismissal of the felonious assault charge; thus, the matter
could not be submitted to another Grand Jury without leave of the court.5 0
Th-. Court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected both of these contentions as
lacking merit. It stated that the szatute which divests Special Sessions of jurisdiction
over misdemeanors cannot be read as destroying the inherent power of the Grand
Jury to find on its own initiative such indictments as are required by the proof
before that body. Neither can the cour. order directing prosecution by indictment
be construed as restricting the Grand Jury powers. The Court held that in the
absence of an express statutory limitation, the traditional power of the Grand
Jury remains unimpaired.
As to defendants' second contention, the Court held that the action of the
first Grand Jury did not amount to a dismissal of the felonious assault charge.
It is only by dear affirmative action that such a dismissal will result.51 Under
section 269 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a dismissal results if twelve jurors
do not concur in finding an indictment. An endorsement to this effect must be
placed on the dispositions which are returned to the court, and this endorsement
must be signed by the foreman before a dismissal of the charge is effected. If
such action is taken, as was not the case here, such dismissal forbids the resubmis-
sion of the charge to another Grand, Jury without a court order.52 Thus, it appears,
such a dismissal cannot, in the face of this statute, be shown by mere implication.
In the present case, therefore, it is apparent that no court order was required
for resubmission to the Grand Jury of the assault charge, that the Grand Jury
was entitled to find a true bill for felonious assault as well as for the misdemeanor
if the evidence so warranted,5a that in the absence of express statutory power,
neither General Sessions nor any other court has authority to divest the Grand
Jury of its inherent powers to hear and indict.
B. The jurisdiction and power of the Grand Jury to find and present indict-
ments have also been discussed in another recent Court of Appeals decision.
In People v. Stern,s defendant sought to have an indictment rendered invalid
on the ground that the Grand Jury, which had its term extended by several court
orders, had no jurisdiction except over matters pending at the time of extension,
and since defendanes case was not before the Grand Jury at that time, the
indictment as to him was invalid. The Court, reversing the lower courts, held
(5-2) that the indictment was valid and that the jurisdiction of the extended
Grand Jury was not restricted to matters before it at the time of the extension.
50. N. Y. CODE CM. PBec. §270.
51. People v. Kelly, 140 Misc. 377, 250 N.Y.Supp. 610 (1931).
52. Hup"a note 50.
53. People v. Acritelli, 57 Misc. 574, 110 N.Y.Supp. 430 (1908).
54. 3 N.Y.2d 658, 171 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1957).
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The Court reiterated that the broad plenary powers of the Grand Jury,
referred to above, may not be restricted in the absence of clear legislative expres-
sion to that effect. The Court noted People v. Ryback5 5 as espousing this
principle.
The County Court00 construed section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to mean that a Grand Jury must be discharged unless it has business still pending.
It held that the apparent purpose of the statute is to provide, with leave of court,
a method by which a Grand Jury may conclude any action which it has begun. An
ordinary construction of the statute, they felt, would thus limit the scope of the
Grand Jury power to such matters. In so construing the statute, the court
dismissed the indictment for lack of Grand Jury power to indict for the offense
charged.
In affirming this dismissal, the Appellate Division5 T viewed the issue more
broadly and considered not only the jurisdiction of the Grand Jury, but also the
jurisdiction of the court for which it is drawn. It felt that since the Grand Jury
is an adjunct to the court, its jurisdiction may not exceed that of the tribunal
for which it is drawn,58 and thus is limited by the term of court for which it sits.59
Therefore, if the court by its extension orders in the present case had limited its
jurisdiction to matters pending before the Grand Jury, the effect was to impose
a similar jurisdictional limitation upon the Grand Jury.
The dissent in the Appellate Division stated that, while the Grand Jury is
an arm of the court for some purposes, it is in some respects free from judicial
restraint.60 The Grand Jury may of its own power investigate upon the existence
of a crime and may indict on its own initiative.61 The dissent was of the opinibn
that, having elected to continue the term of court and its Grand Jury, the county
judge could not restrain the Grand Jury from performing the duties or exercising
the power granted to that body by statutory law.
The Court, in the instant case, rebutted the Appellate Division's argument,
to the effect that the Grand Jury's jurisdiction is limited to the term of court for
which it is impaneled, by stating, "It is clear that in this state the Legislature has
not limited the broad grant of jurisdiction to the Grand Jury by confining it in all
instances to the jurisdiction of the court for which it is impaneled.' '6 2 In support
of this contention the Court points to sections 39 and 40 of the Code of Criminal
55. Supra note 48.
56. 3 Misc.2d 268, 154 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956).
57. 3 A.D.2d 443, 162 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1956).
58. Spector v. Allen. 281 N.Y. 251, 22 N.E.2d 360 (1939).
59. People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N.Y. 533, 101 N.E. 442 (1913).
60. Supra note 41; People v. Glenn, 173 N.E. 395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903).
61. Supra note 44.
62. Supra note 54 at 660.
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Procedure. Subdivision 2 of section 39 gives the County Court, with certain
exceptions not relevant here, limited power to try and determine indictments.
However, under subdivision 1 of that section the County Courts have jurisdiction
to inquire, by Grand Jury, into all crimes committed or triable in the county.
Another indication of the legislative intent that the power of the Grand Jury
extend beyond the limited jurisdiction of the County Court is found in the
requirement that a County Court must send every indictment there found for a
crime not triable therein to the Supreme Court to *try and determine the same.'10 3
Therefore, the Court concluded, it is clear that the Grand Jury is in independent
body, as far as its jurisdiction is concerned, and the exercise of its plenary power
is not dependent on the court to which it is adjunct. The Grand Jury derives its
powers and prerogatives from the Constitution and statutes, not from any court.
Since the County Court is not the source of these powers no judge thereof can limit
the Grand Jury in exercising them.
The Court also held section 244 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be
inapplicable in this case. The purpose of this section was to insure a speedy trial
to alleged violators of the law in counties where only two Grand Juries are
convened yearly. Prior to the enactment of this statute, the Grand Jury was
automatically discharged at the end of its term. Persons charged with crimes
during the period between Grand Juries, whether guilty or not, would have to be
incarcerated until the next body was convened. This sometimes involved a period
of several months. With the enactment of the statute in question the Grand Jury,
rather than being discharged, is adjourned and not finally discharged until the
first day of the next term of court for which a Grand Jury is drawn. Such
adjourned body may be reconvened upon a court order issuing after an application
by the District Attorney or by a person accused of a crime.0 4 . Since the Grand
Jury in the present case had been extended by court orders and never adjourned or
reconvened, the Court held the above statute to be inapplicable.
There being no statute in New York which expressly confines or limits an
extended Grand Jury to those matters inquired into during its original term, it
follows that the indictment in question was valid and the opinion of the Appellate
Division must be rejected as being based on the unacceptable postulate that rules
and orders of the County Court are superior to the Constitution and statutes
conferring power on, and delineating functions of the Grand Jury.
Thus, in People v. Ryback and People v. Stern the Court of Appeals, in the
interests of a strong and independent Grand Jury system, has reaffirmed the stated
policy of allowing these bodies the widest latitude in the exercise of their powers.
63. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §40.
64. 16th ANNUAL REPORT OF N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1950, pp. 245-251.
